Abraham Lincoln’s greatness as president is usually measured by two outcomes: he preserved the Union, and he helped bring about the end of slavery. Both changed the course of American history. But outcomes alone don’t explain him. Plenty of presidents have faced crises, and few are remembered for how they carried them.
The country he inherited in March 1861 was already coming apart. Seven states had left the Union before he took the oath of office. Four years later, the nation had endured a devastating war, slavery was headed for constitutional abolition, and Lincoln had helped redefine what the Union was for.
I’d argue his greatness lay in three things: how he used power when the stakes were highest, what he refused to give up when giving it up would have been easier, and his willingness to admit he was wrong. These qualities weren't expressed in a single grand gesture. Each was revealed in decisions that tested his character when the consequences were real.
Judgment: The Power of Life and Death
The war handed Lincoln decisions with no easy answers. As commander in chief, he had to weigh principle, national survival, and the limits of his authority. Character under that pressure shows in how a president uses power over other people’s lives.
Consider Private William Scott, a young Vermont soldier sentenced to death in 1861 for falling asleep on guard duty. Pleas for mercy reached the White House, and Lincoln intervened to secure clemency.
Lincoln wasn’t dismissing military discipline. A sleeping sentry could get others killed. He was recognizing that a serious offense doesn’t automatically deserve the harshest punishment necessary.
A far harder test came in December 1862. After the U.S.–Dakota War in Minnesota, military commissions condemned 303 Dakota men to death. The conflict had grown out of broken treaties, stolen land, and hunger, and it had also brought killings of settlers. Minnesota officials and a furious public demanded that every sentence be carried out.
Lincoln requested the trial records and reviewed them himself. In a December 11 message to the Senate, he described the line he was trying to walk: he was “anxious to not act with so much clemency as to encourage another outbreak on the one hand, nor with so much severity as to be real cruelty on the other.”
He looked first for men convicted of rape, then widened his review to distinguish those who had participated in massacres of civilians from those who had fought in battles. He approved 39 executions. One man was later reprieved, and on December 26, 1862, 38 Dakota men were hanged at Mankato—the largest mass execution in American history.
This was not a clean act of mercy. The trials were rushed, serious questions remain about their fairness, and 38 men died. An honest account must acknowledge that. But Lincoln did not simply approve the entire list. He examined the cases and made distinctions under enormous pressure to do otherwise.
Minnesota Governor Alexander Ramsey later recalled telling Lincoln that executing all 303 men would have given Republicans a wider margin in the state. Lincoln’s reported reply was blunt:
“I could not afford to hang men for votes.”
Power was not the prize. It was a trust, and Lincoln was willing to pay a political price for exercising it carefully.
He faced a different test of that principle when his own political career was on the line. On August 23, 1864, Lincoln wrote a confidential memorandum anticipating defeat. He pledged that, between the election and inauguration, he would cooperate with the president-elect to save the Union. He folded and sealed the document, then asked his Cabinet to sign the back without seeing what they were endorsing. Lincoln was asking his advisers to commit themselves to a course of action they could not yet know—a remarkable measure of secrecy for a contingency he believed might soon become reality.
The memorandum reveals a president preparing to put the Union ahead of his own political future. He did not know whether he would win reelection, but he was already considering what his duty would require if he lost.
Fidelity: What He Would Not Give Up
Lincoln did not begin his presidency with a plan for nationwide abolition. In his First Inaugural Address, he said he had no intention of interfering with slavery where it existed. He opposed its expansion, but his immediate aim was to save the Union. His early policy fell short of what abolitionists demanded and of the moral challenge slavery posed.
But he never believed slavery was acceptable. In April 1864, he wrote to Albert G. Hodges: “If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong.” Political and constitutional limits, in his mind, were not the same as moral indifference.
The real test came when holding to that conviction threatened his political future. In the summer of 1864, with the war grinding on and defeat looming, Lincoln faced pressure to soften his position on emancipation and make peace with the Confederacy. In an August 17 letter to Charles D. Robinson, he addressed a proposal that would have returned Black Union soldiers to slavery. He wrote that he “should be damned in time and in eternity” if he did so.
Black men were serving in the Union army because the Emancipation Proclamation had opened the ranks to them. Lincoln understood that the government had a responsibility to those who had taken up arms for the Union. He would not promise them freedom and then abandon them for political advantage.
The Thirteenth Amendment followed the same logic. The Emancipation Proclamation applied only to areas still in rebellion; it left slavery intact in the loyal border states and depended on Union victory. Only a constitutional amendment could abolish slavery throughout the country.
After the amendment passed the Senate in 1864 but failed in the House, Lincoln pressed Congress to take it up again and worked to secure the necessary votes. The House passed it on January 31, 1865. Lincoln signed the resolution the next day, although his signature was not required.
Fidelity to what was right did not mean Lincoln never compromised. It meant that compromise did not get the last word.
Willingness to Be Wrong
Of the three qualities, this may be the least obvious and the most important. A president commands enormous authority, but authority does not guarantee wisdom. The scrutiny of high office can encourage a leader to surround himself with sycophants and defend bad decisions simply because reversing them looks weak.
Lincoln operated differently. He appointed rivals to his Cabinet, including William Seward, Salmon Chase, and Edward Bates. These were men with their own ambitions and ideas about how to run the war. Lincoln needed their abilities, but he also had to govern alongside people who did not simply defer to him.
In 1862, Seward advised waiting for a Union military victory before issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, warning that it might otherwise look like a gesture of desperation. Lincoln listened. After Antietam, he issued the preliminary proclamation. He had considered Seward’s advice without surrendering his own judgment.
An even clearer example came during the campaign to capture Vicksburg in 1863. Lincoln doubted Grant’s daring plan to cut his own supply lines and and attack Vicksburg from the south. He thought Grant should stop and reinforce General Nathaniel Banks instead.
Grant pressed ahead and won a decisive victory. Nine days after Vicksburg fell, Lincoln wrote to his general:
“I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right, and I was wrong.”
Lincoln put his admission in writing to the very general whose judgment he had questioned. His authority did not depend on pretending to be infallible. He could recognize a better judgment—and publicaly acknowledge it—without treating it as a threat to his own.
His thinking changed on a larger question as well. In August 1862, Lincoln urged a delegation of Black leaders at the White House to consider leaving the country and establishing communities elsewhere. It remains one of the most uncomfortable episodes of his presidency. He later moved away from colonization, and by April 11, 1865, in what proved to be his final public address, he advocated voting rights for some Black men—specifically, those who were educated or had served as Union soldiers.
Black Americans, abolitionists, soldiers, and members of Congress helped drive that change. Lincoln was not its sole author. But he had to decide whether to move with it, and he did. Three days after that speech, he was shot.
The lesson is not that Lincoln always knew the right answer. The lesson is that a willingness to be wrong is not the same as abandoning a principle when it becomes inconvenient. A leader can remain committed to a goal while recognizing that his judgment about how to reach it must change.
The Takeaway: The Measure of Presidential Greatness
Abraham Lincoln did not lead the nation with a perfect plan or without contradictions. His presidency was full of compromises, reversals and decisions he could not take back. Calling him great does not require us to ignore any of that.
It requires us to look at how he used power when the stakes were highest, whether he held to a conviction when convenience offered an easier road, and whether he could reconsider when the facts changed. In each case, his record is imperfect—but revealing.
In his Annual Message of December 1862, as the war dragged on and emancipation neared, Lincoln reminded Congress that responsibility rested with those entrusted to govern:
“We—even we here—hold the power and bear the responsibility.”
He ended that message by stating what was at stake:
“We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth.”
Lincoln understood that leadership was not simply about possessing power or winning a contest. It was about accepting responsibility for what one did with power—and for what happened when one got it wrong.
He did not have to be right from the beginning. He had to be willing to carry the responsibility and to learn.
That, to me, is what made Abraham Lincoln a great president.
Mac
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Sources:
All quotations and correspondence of Abraham Lincoln are cited from Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 8 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953).
Governor Alexander Ramsey’s account is preserved in Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 1861–1865 (St. Paul: Pioneer Press, 1890).
Cabinet discussions referenced from Francis B. Carpenter, Six Months at the White House with Abraham Lincoln (New York: Hurd and Houghton, 1866).
Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), especially Chapters 17, 24, and 26 for discussion of the Cabinet dynamics, the July 1862 Emancipation consultation, and the August 1864 Blind Memorandum.













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