🧩 President Abraham Lincoln’s Constitutional Puzzle: Can Secession From Secession Equal Admission?

 

👉 Question: Can a state break away from a state that broke away from the Union — and still join the Union?

Or to put it another way: Can secession from secession equal admission? 

📖 The Backstory

In December 1862, as the nation tore itself apart in civil war, Abraham Lincoln was confronted with that exact dilemma. Loyal counties in western Virginia wanted to leave Virginia and sought recognition as their own state, “West Virginia.” It amounted to act of secession — but this time they were leaving the Confederacy in favor of the Union.

To untangle the legal paradox, Lincoln’s first move was to see what the Constitution actually required for admitting a new state.

📜 Constitutional Rule (Article IV, Section 3)

Here's what's written in Article IV:

• Consent of Congress: Congress must pass a law admitting the new state. 

• Consent of the parent state legislature: If the new state is carved out of an existing one, that state’s legislature must agree. 

• Final Admission: The President’s signature. 

After heated and acrimonious debate in both chambers, the House and Senate passed “An Act for the admission of the State of 'West-Virginia' into the Union,” thus completing the first step in the constitutional process. The next two steps—state consent and his signature—created the dilemma and placed the need for a solution squarely in Lincoln’s hands.

🧩 The Puzzle Lincoln Faced

The Constitution required that any new state carved from an existing one must have the consent of the “Legislature of the State concerned.” In late 1862, that stipulation posed a dilemma: Virginia was in rebellion. The official government in Richmond had seceded and joined the Confederacy, making it impossible to secure their approval for a new state.

However, Union loyalists in the western counties organized a rump government [*] in Wheeling, known as the Restored Government of Virginia, and claimed to be the "legitimate" legislature. This body granted its consent for West Virginia to separate.

A state was struggling to emerge from a parent already torn in two, in the midst of a nation that was also torn in two. The central dilemma was which legislature held legitimate authority — the loyal body in Wheeling or the secessionist one in Richmond. That clash defined Lincoln’s constitutional puzzle.To untangle the knot, Lincoln did what he often did in moments of uncertainty: he turned to his Cabinet — not to surrender the decision, for he knew the responsibility was his alone, but to test every argument and weigh the problem from all sides.

🏛️ Lincoln’s Cabinet Divided

Lincoln’s famous ‘Cabinet of Rivals’ was filled with strong personalities — some brilliant, some obstinate — but Lincoln’s strength lay in listening carefully and weighing their counsel. He invited disagreement, respected independent voices, and valued their diverse experience. But ultimately he made the call himself. This was his leadership style at its best. [1]

So on December 23, he sent a memo to each of the six sitting members asking them to weigh in: 

Gentleman of the Cabinet A bill for an act entitled "An Act for the admission of the State of `West-Virginia' into the Union" . . . has passed the House of Representatives, and the Senate, and has been duly presented to me for my action.

I respectfully ask of each [of] you, an opinion in writing, on the following questions, towit:

1st. Is the said Act constitutional?

2d. Is the said Act expedient? [2]

The responses revealed a deep divide on the issue. William H. Seward (State), Salmon P. Chase (Treasury), and Edwin M. Stanton (War) answered affirmatively on both counts. Gideon Welles (Navy), Montgomery Blair (Postmaster), and Edward Bates (Attorney General) argued the opposite, warning that the measure was unconstitutional and dangerous as precedent. Lincoln was left with a split verdict from some of the sharpest minds in his administration.

The division in Lincoln’s Cabinet was hardly unexpected. Congress itself had been riven by the same arguments — loyalty and expediency on one side, constitutional scruple on the other. In that sense, the Cabinet’s split verdict simply mirrored the bitter debate already unfolding in the House and Senate.

He distilled the competing arguments into a clear rationale, turning disagreement into the raw material for judgment. With his characteristic blend of precision and pragmatism, he set about drafting an opinion that would reconcile law with necessity.

🖋️ Lincoln’s Opinion

On December 31, Lincoln wrote his own opinion — not for publication, and perhaps not even for sharing — but as a way of working through the puzzle. In this sense, the document feels almost like one of his famous “fragments,” those private notes where he tested arguments and clarified his thinking.

He returned to the two questions he had posed to his Cabinet: Which legislature counted? And, was admission expedient? His opinion supplied clear answers to both.

⚖️ Secession Against vs. Secession For the Constitution  (Answer to Question 1)

At its core was the constitutional knot: which legislature held legitimate authority — the loyalist body in Wheeling or the secessionist one in Richmond? Lincoln’s answer was sharp. Legitimacy, he argued, comes not from all qualified voters — both those who are loyal and those who are traitors. It comes only from those who remain loyal and participate. To count rebels as equal citizens in constitutional math would be absurd: “If so, their treason against the constitution, enhances their constitutional value!”

In other words, rebellion cannot be rewarded with political say-so. Richmond’s act of secession forfeited its authority, while Wheeling’s loyalty magnified its claim of legitimacy. What might normally have been a weak rump legislature gained authority precisely because the official government had defected. Lincoln reframed West Virginia’s breakaway not as betrayal but as preservation: “There is still difference enough between secession against the constitution, and secession in favor of the constitution,” he wrote.

In other words, West Virginia’s “secession” was not an act of destruction but of preservation. With that, Lincoln answered his first question. [3]

❓ The Question of Expediency (Answer to Question 2)

Once Lincoln had reasoned that admitting West Virginia was constitutional, he turned to the harder, practical question: Was it wise? For him, expediency meant asking whether admission would strengthen or weaken the Union cause. His answer was clear: West Virginia’s loyalty was too valuable to risk losing.

He noted that the western counties regarded admission as “a matter of life and death.” Rejecting their bid would shatter confidence and cooperation; admitting them secured trust and ensured continued support in Congress and on the battlefield. “We can scarcely dispense with the aid of West-Virginia in this struggle,” he reasoned.

There was also a moral dimension. Admission turned “that much slave soil to free,” striking at the rebellion’s foundation. Expediency was not just about strategy — it was about aligning survival with principle. Even fears of precedent, he argued, should not outweigh wartime necessity: “A measure made expedient by a war, is no precedent for times of peace.” [3]

✅ Lincoln’s Resolution

In the West Virginia statehood case, Lincoln confronted the paradox of “secession from secession.” He treated Wheeling as the legitimate legislature, reasoning that rebellion forfeited Richmond’s authority. He balanced interpretation against wartime necessity and chose to honor the loyalty of West Virginians who had risked everything to stand with the Union.

📝 Conclusion

The West Virginia case exposed a raw nerve in the Constitution: How could a new state be carved from one whose government had itself abandoned the Union? Lincoln faced the paradox of “secession from secession,” a problem the framers had never imagined. His answer was to redefine "legitimacy" in wartime: rebellion forfeited authority, while loyalty magnified it. From that principle, he recognized Wheeling’s consent as valid.

Yet Lincoln did not stop at legality. He weighed expediency, insisting that West Virginia’s loyalty was indispensable both on the battlefield and in Congress, and that turning slave soil to free was a moral victory as well as a strategic one. In balancing law with necessity, he showed that constitutional scruple and wartime pragmatism could be reconciled.

By signing the bill on December 31, 1862, Lincoln did more than admit a new state. He demonstrated how a president could navigate constitutional pain points with courage and clarity, transforming division into resolution. In the crucible of war, he proved that survival and principle could advance together — even when the Constitution itself seemed to falter.

An intriguing approach to a constitutional puzzle, drawn from the private notes of Abraham Lincoln, Storyteller.

FYI: The very next day, January 1, 1863, Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation — another unprecedented constitutional act that reshaped the Union.

Mac

[*] A rump government is the remnant of a larger government that continues to claim legitimacy even after losing control of most of its territory or authority. In this case, the Unionist government in Wheeling was the "rump government".

🎩 Enjoy word puzzles too? Here's one Abe made up and gave to a clerk of the court in one of the towns on the Eight Judicial Circuit. Read: 'Bass-Ackwards' - An Abe Lincoln spoonerism story

📚 Works Cited

[1] Goodwin DK. (2005) Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

[2] Lincoln A. To Members of the Cabinet [Request for Opinions on West Virginia Admission]. December 23, 1862. In: Basler RL, ed. Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Vol. 6. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press; 1953:300‑302. Originals in Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress. 

[3] Lincoln A. Opinion on the Admission of West Virginia into the Union. December 31, 1862. In: Basler RL, ed. Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Vol. 6. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press; 1953:51‑55. Available from: University of Michigan Digital Collections.